Summary. In the spirit of Richardson's original (1948) study of the statistics of deadly conflicts, we study the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks worldwide over the past 38 years, and show that these events are uniformly characterized by the phenomenon of scale invariance, i.e., the frequency scales as an inverse power of the severity, P (x) ∝ x −α . We show that this property is a robust feature of terrorism, existing in terrorism that targets both industrialized and non-industrialized countries, across different weapon types and even over short time-scales. We show that the scaling exponent fluctuates about α = 2.5, that the center of the distribution oscillates slightly with a period of roughly τ ≈ 13 years, and that current models of event incidence cannot account for the variation in event severity or the scale invariance property of global terrorism. Finally, we propose a simple toy model for the generation of these statistics, and briefly discuss its implications.
Introduction
Richardson first introduced the concept of scale invariance, i.e., a power-law scaling between dependent and independent variables, to the study of conflict by examining the frequency versus severity statistics of large and small conflicts (Richardson, 1948) . His work demonstrated that for both wars and small-scale homicides, the frequency of an event scales as an inverse power of the event's severity (in this case, the number of casualties). Richardson, and subsequent researchers, found that the frequency of wars of a size x scale as P (x) ∝ x −α , where α ≈ 2 and is called the scaling exponent. Recently, power-law statistics have been found to characterize a wide variety of phenomena include natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods and forest fires (Bak and Tang, 1989; Turcotte et al., 1998; Newman, 2005) , the distribution of city sizes, the number of citations for scientific papers and the frequency of words in language (Zipf, 1949; Simon, 1955; Newman, 2005) , among others. As a reflection of their apparent ubiquity, it has even been said, somewhat pejoratively, that such extremal statistics are "more normal than normal" (Lun et al., 2005) . What distinguishes the power law distribution from the normal distribution is its heavy tail, i.e., there is a non-trivial amount of weight far from the center of the distribution. This in turn implies that events orders of magnitude larger (or smaller) than the mean are relatively common; the power-law distribution is one particular kind of heavy-tailed distribution and is most commonly identified by a straight line with slope α on doubly-logarithmic axes. We refer to Newman (2005) for more details on power laws, their properties and their measurement.
Here, we extend Richardson's program of study to the most topical kind of conflict: terrorism. Specifically, we empirically study the distributional nature of the frequency and severity of terrorist events worldwide since 1968. Although terrorism as a political tool has a long history (Congleton, 2002) , it is only in the modern era that small groups of so-motivated individuals have had access to extremely destructive weapons (FBI, 1999; Shubik, 1997) . Access to such weapons has resulted in severe terrorist events such as the 20 March 1995 release of the Sarin nerve agent in a Tokyo subway which injured or killed over 5000, the 7 August 1998 car bombing in Nairobi, Kenya which injured or killed over 5200, or the more well known attack on 11 September 2001 in New York City which killed 2749. Conventional wisdom holds that these rare-but-severe events are outliers, i.e., they are qualitatively different from the more common smaller terrorist attacks that kill or injure only a few people. Although that impression may be true from an operational standpoint, it is false from a statistical standpoint. The frequency-severity statistics of terrorist events are scale invariant and, consequently, there is no fundamental difference between small and large events; both are consistent with a single underlying distribution. This in turn suggests that there is no reason to expect that "major" or more severe terrorist attacks should require qualitatively different explanations than less salient forms of terrorism.
Just as research on conflict has tended to study war as a dichotomous event rather than examine their magnitude or severity of violence (Cederman, 2003; Lacina, 2006) , the traditional approach to empirical research on terrorism has focused on incidence of terrorist events, without distinguishing their severity or lethality. Recently, however, two of the authors of this report demonstrated for the first time that the relationship between the frequency and severity of terrorist events exhibits the surprising and robust feature of scale invariance (Clauset and Young, 2005) . In an important study, Johnson et al. (2005 Johnson et al. ( , 2006 subsequently considered the frequency and severity of fatal attacks or clashes in guerilla warfare environments such as the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Colombia. They suggest that the time-varying behavior of the distributions in those two conflicts are trending toward a common power law with scaling exponent α = 2.5 -a value they note as being similar to the one reported by Clauset and Young (2005) for terrorist events in economically underdeveloped nations. They then propose a mathematical model of such guerilla conflicts that produces this scaling exponent, and conjecture that, as a result, the conflicts of Iraq, Colombia, Afghanistan, Casamance (Senegal), Indonesia, Israel, Northern Ireland and terrorism are converging to a universal distribution with this value of α (Johnson et al., 2006) . Another important deviation from the traditional approach to the study of terrorism is the work of Bogen and Jones (2006) , who focus primarily on aggregate figures in assessing whether there is an increase in the severity of terrorism over time and forecasting mortality due to terrorism.
These lines of inquiry point to many new questions in the study of terrorism. An adequate model of terrorism should not only give us indications of where or when terrorist events are likely to occur, but also generate other significant statistical patterns, such as the observed frequency distribution of events and their severity. Later in this paper we will examine to what extent models proposed to account for the location of terrorist incidents can also account for differences in their severity. We first start with a brief overview of data Table 1 . A summary of the distributions shown in Figure 1 , with power-law fits from the maximum likelihood method. N (N tail ) depicts the number of events in the full (tail) distribution. The parenthetical value depicts the standard error of the last digit of the estimated scaling exponent. on terrorism, and examine the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks.
Distribution

Data sources for terrorist events
Many organizations track terrorist events worldwide, but few provide their data in a form amenable to scientific analysis. The most popular source of information on terrorist events in the political science literature is the ITERATE data set (Mickolus et al., 2004) , which focuses exclusively on transnational terrorist events involving actors from at least two countries. In principle, however, at least from the standpoint of frequency and severity statistics, we see no reason to restrict our analysis to transnational events. Instead, we use the data contained in the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) database (MIPT, 2006) , which largely overlaps with the ITERATE data, but includes fully domestic terrorist events, as well. We note, however, that our analyses are easily be applied to the portion of the ITERATE data that reports event severity; doing so yields evidence similar to that which we present here. Thus, without loss of generality and except where noted, we will focus exclusively on the MIPT data for the remainder of the paper. The MIPT database is itself the compilation of the RAND Terrorism Chronology 1968-1997, the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident database (1998-Present), the Terrorism Indictment database (University of Arkansas & University of Oklahoma), and DFI International's research on terrorist organizations. At the end of 2005, the MIPT database contained records for over 24 602 terrorist events in more than 4500 cities across 187 countries worldwide between 1968 and 2005. Although alternative definitions for terrorism exist, the MIPT database uses a relatively standard one that may be summarized as any violent act intended to create fear for political purposes. Each entry in the database is quite narrow: it is an attack on a single target in a single location (city) on a single day. For example, the Al Qaeda attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 appear as three events in the database, one for each of the locations: New York City, Washington D.C. and Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Each record includes the date, target, city (if applicable), country, type of weapon used, terrorist group responsible (if known), number of deaths (if known), number of injuries (if known), a brief description of the attack and the source of the information.
Of the nearly twenty-five thousand recorded events, 8 438 of them resulted in at least one person being injured or killed, and we restrict our analyses to these events as they appear to be the least susceptible to any reporting bias. Further, it is reasonable to assume that large events, as a result of their severity both in terms of casualties and political repercussions, will have more reliable severity estimates. However, we also note that a proportionally small under-or over-estimate of the severity of any event will have only a small effect the results Table 1. of our statistical analysis and will not change the core result of scale invariance. As with Richardson's study of the severity of wars, simply obtaining the correct order of magnitude of an event reveals much of the basic scaling behavior. Throughout the remainder of the paper, we will define the severity of an event to be either the number of injuries, the number of deaths, or their sum, where the severity is always greater than zero. Unless otherwise noted, we focus exclusively on the statistics of these values.
Frequency-severity distributions for attacks since 1968
Collecting all events since 1968 as a histogram of severity, we show their cumulative distribution functions P (X ≥ x) in Figure 1 . The regular scaling in the upper tails of these distributions immediately demonstrates that events orders of magnitude larger than the average event size are not outliers, but are instead in concordance with a global pattern in the frequency statistics of terrorist attacks. Significantly, the scaling exists despite large structural and political changes in the international system such as the fall of communism, the type of weapon used, recent technological developments, the demise of individual terrorist organizations and the geographic distribution of events. In subsequent sections, we will examine the robustness of the scale invariance to both categorical and temporal analysis.
If we make the idealization that events are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), we may model the distribution as a power law with some exponent α. Obviously, significant correlations between many events exist, but for the sake of a parsimonious model, we ignore that fact for the moment. Using the method of maximum likelihood (Newman, 2005) , we use the data to estimate the scaling exponent α and the lower-limit of the scaling behavior x min . Models found in this way are summarized in Table 1 . Statistically, we find by using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that these i.i.d. models are surprisingly good for representing the death and total severity distributions (p KS > 0.99 and p KS > 0.9, respectively), and that there is insufficient evidence to reject it as a model of the injury-severity distribution at the 0.05 level.
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In Section 7, we will see that the quality of the total severity model improves when we decompose it into component distributions, each of which is strongly scale invariant, but with different scaling and limit parameters. As mentioned earlier, the power law is not the only distribution with a heavy tail, and although testing all such alternatives is beyond the scope of this paper, we tested another common distribution, the log-normal (see, for instance, Serfling (2002)), and found in all cases that we may reject this model (p KS < 0.05).
Evolution of terrorism over time
Because events in the database are annotated with their incidence date, we may order them so as to produce a time-series by which to investigate properties of the severity distribution as a function of time.
2 Although our ultimate interest is in the property of scale invariance over time, we will first consider a more simple measure of the distribution's shape, the average log-severity. Sliding a window 24 months wide over the 38 years of event data, we compute the average log-severity (deaths) of events within each window. For highly skewed distributions, such as those we show in Figure 1 , the average log-severity measures the position on the independent axis of the distribution's center in a way that reduces its sensitivity to the variations, from the occasional presence of rare-but-severe events, in the range of the upper tail. The resulting time series of this measure is shown in the upper-pane of Figure 2 , with standard error bounds. Notably, this function is largely stable over the 38 years of data in the MIPT database, illustrating that the center of the distribution has not varied substantially over that time. A close examination of the fluctuations, however, suggests the presence of potential periodic variation. We investigate this possibility by taking the autocorrelation function (ACF) of the time series, which is shown in the lowerpane. The noticeable sinusoidal shape in the ACF shows that the fluctuations do exhibit a strong degree of periodicity on the order of τ ≈ 13 years. Notably, the size of the sliding window does not substantially effect either the magnitude of the auto-correlation or its periodicity, and we have examined results for windows of 12 to 60 or more months (data not shown). Thus, we conjecture that this periodicity is, in fact, a natural feature of global terrorism, although we have no explanation for its origin. 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 The autocorrelation function of the average log-severity, illustrating a strong periodicity in the breadth of the distribution at roughly τ ≈ 13 years.
Scale invariance over time
Turning now to the question of scale invariance, we use a similar sliding-window methodology to partition events into discrete groups. Here, we take a window of 60 months to ensure the presence of enough data to reasonably estimate the power-law parameters under our methodology. The time dependence of the power-law exponent α for the conflicts of Colombia and Iraq was first discussed by Johnson et al. (2005) . We expand upon this idea and fit both parameters of our model to the time-varying data, plotting the resulting timeseries of scaling exponents for the frequency-severity (deaths) distribution in Figure 3a . To avoid problems related to statistical artifacts, we omit data points that are not statistically significant with respect to our power-law model; the dashed lines indicate standard error bounds, and the solid line illustrates the slight linear trend in the inferred parameter timeseries. The corresponding statistical significance measures are shown in the upper-pane of Figure 3b , the inferred values of x min in the middle-pane, and the average inter-event interval, i.e., the average delay between events worldwide, is shown in the lower-pane.
The fluctuations in the vicinity of the value α = 2.5 agree with the conclusions we draw from the average log-severity time-series (Fig. 2 ) in the previous section, i.e., the general shape of the distribution of the severity of terrorist events has not changed substantially over the past 38 years. Under the idealized assumption that events are drawn i.i.d. from a powerlaw distribution, the emergence of extremely severe events in recent years can be attributed to the continual rise in the frequency of attacks. The lower-pane of Figure 3b illustrates that the average number of events (or here, its reciprocal, the mean inter-event interval) per unit 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 time has been steadily increasing. In heavy-tailed distributions, this implies a progressively deeper exploration of the tail of the distribution, i.e., the incidence of progressively more severe events. Although the assumption of i.i.d. is clearly an idealization, it is surprising how well it captures the dynamics and properties of the severity distribution.
One might seek to explain the increase in the frequency of events, a fact that is consistent with the most recent report on global trends in terrorism by the United States Department of State (2004) , by normalizing the incidence rate to the world population. For example, the inter-event interval falls from ∆t ≈ 168 hours, for the period 1975 -1979 , to ∆t ≈ 9 hours for 2001 -2005 . Between these periods, the world's population only doubled (roughly), while the frequency of terrorist events increased almost twenty-fold. This suggests that the true change in the nature of global terrorism over the recent past is not in the frequencyseverity distribution, which has remained stable for decades, but rather in the frequency with which events are drawn from that distribution.
Variation in scale invariance by target-country industrialization
Let us now examine the impact of industrialization on the frequency-severity distribution of terrorist events worldwide -given that each attack is executed within a specific country, we may ask whether there is a significant difference in the scaling behaviors of events within industrialized and non-industrialized countries. We divide the events since 1968 into those that occurred within the 30 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations (1282 events, or 18%), and those that occurred throughout the rest of the world (5806 events, or 82%). We plot the corresponding total severity distributions in Figure 4a (also summarized in Table 2 ).
Most notably, we find substantial differences in the scaling of the two distributions, where industrialized-nation events scale as α OECD = 2.06(9) while non-industrialized-nation events Table 2 , found by the maximum likelihood method.
scale more steeply, as α non−OECD = 2.46(7). The moral here is that while events have, to date, been less likely to occur within the major industrialized nations, when they do, they tend to be more severe than their non-industrialized counterparts. Although this distinction is plausibly the result of technological differences, i.e., industrialization itself makes possible more severe events, it may also arise because industrialized nations are targeted by more severe attacks for political reasons. We leave the exploration of such questions for the future.
Variation in scale invariance by weapon type
As our last characterization of the scale-invariant frequency-severity distribution, we consider the connection between technology, represented by the type of weapon used in an attack, and the severity of the event. Figure 4b shows the total severity distributions for chemical or biological weapons, explosives (including remotely detonated devices), fire, firearms, knives and a catch-all category "other" (which also includes unconventional 3 and unknown weapons). We find that these component distributions themselves exhibit scale invariance, each with a unique exponent α and lower limit of the power-law scaling x min . However, for the explosives and chemical or biological weapons distributions, we must make a few caveats. In the latter case, the sparsity of data reduces the power of our statistical tests, while for the former, there is clearly another phenomenon at play in the lower tail. We summarize these distributions and their power law models in Table 2 .
Through this partitioning of events, we can now see that the origin of the bending in the lower tail of the injuries distribution (Fig. 1a) is from explosive attacks , i.e., there is something special about attacks utilizing explosives that makes them significantly more Table 2 . A summary of the distributions shown in Figure 4 , with power-law fits from the maximum likelihood method. N (N tail ) depicts the number of events in the full (tail) distribution. The parenthetical value depicts the standard error of the last digit of the estimated scaling exponent. likely to injure small or moderate numbers of people than one would expect from the power-law model. However, this property fails for larger events and the scaling resumes in the upper tail. In contrast, we see no such change in the scaling behavior in the lower tail for other weapons -this demonstrates that the property of scale invariance is largely independent of the choice of weapon. Further, by partitioning events according to their weapon type, we typically recover high estimates of statistical significance (p KS > 0.95).
Distribution
A regression model for the severity of terrorist events
There is an extensive literature on what factors promote terrorism and make governments more likely to become targets of terrorism. We refer to Pape (2003) , Reich (1990) , and Rosendorff and Sandler (2005) for overviews of existing studies of terrorism. Notably, however, existing studies say nothing about the severity-frequency distribution of events, and empirical research on terrorism has tended to focus predicting terrorist incidence. In this section, we consider to what extent models proposed to predict the incidence of terrorism data can account for the severity of terrorism, and reproduce the observed frequency-severity distribution.
As an example of empirical studies on the frequency of terrorist incidents, we use a recent study by Li (2005) . He explores empirically the impact of a large number of political and economic factors hypothesized to make transnational terrorist incidents more or less likely. In particular, he argues that while some features of democratic institutions such as greater executive constraints tend to make terrorist incidents more likely, other features such as democratic participation are associated with fewer incidents. Model (1) in Table 3 displays the coefficient estimates for Li's original results from a negative binomial regression of the number of transnational terrorist, with each country-year as the unit of observation. We refer to the original Li (2005) article for all details on variable construction, etc.
Since our data are based on terrorist incidents that are not limited to transnational events, 4 we first replicate the Li model for incidents in the MIPT data to ensure that our results are not an artifact of systematic differences between transnational and domestic terrorist events. The coefficient estimates for the Li model applied to the number of incidents Table 3 . Coefficients for a negative binomial regression model on terrorist event incidence, after Li (2005) , and its ability to predict observed severity statistics; parenthetical entries give robust standard errors.
(1) in the MIPT data shown as Model (2) in Table 3 are generally reasonably similar to the results for original model, suggesting that the model behaves similarly when applied to the two sources of data on terrorism. Next, we examine to what extent the right-hand side covariates in the Li model allows us to predict to differences in the severity of terrorism. Model (3) in Table 3 displays the results for a negative binomial regression of the number of deaths among the lethal events in the MIPT data. Comparing the size of the coefficient estimates to their standard errors suggest that none of these coefficients are distinguishable from 0, with the possible exception of the estimate for Europe and the post-cold war period. In other words, none of the factors proposed by Li seem to be good predictors of the severity of terrorist events. Moreover, the proposed Li model fails to generate predictions that in any way resemble the observed variation in the number of deaths: the largest predicted number of deaths for any observation in the observed sample is less than 10, far below the actual observed maximum of 2749 (i.e., the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center). The original Li model examines the number of incidents by country-year, and it may therefore be argued that looking only at events with casualties could understate the possible success of the model in identifying countries that are unlikely to become targets of terrorist incidents. The results for the Li model applied to the total events for all country-years, Model (4) in Table 3 , however, do not lend much support to this. Very few of the features emphasized by Li have coefficient estimates distinguishable from 0 by conventional significance criteria, and the highest predicted number of deaths for any one country-year in the sample is still less than 16. As such, this model is clearly not able to generate the upper tail of the observed severity distribution.
A toy model for scale invariance through competitive forces
As we have seen in the previous section, a standard regression model for event incidence is a poor predictor of event severity, and it fails to reproduce the observed scale invariance in the tail of the frequency-severity statistics. Thus, it is reasonable to turn to alternative models to explain this robust statistical feature. Power laws themselves can arise from a wide variety of processes (Newman, 2005; Mitzenmacher, 2004; Farmer and Geanakoplos, 2005) . For disasters such as earthquakes, floods, forest fires and wars, the model of self-organized criticality (SOC) (Bak et al., 1987 ), a physics model for equilibrium critical phenomena 5 in spatially extended systems, appears to be the most reasonable explanation (Bak and Tang, 1989; Turcotte et al., 1998; Cederman, 2003) as events themselves are spatial. However, such models seem ill-suited for terrorism, in which the severity of an event is not directly related to its spatial extent.
One trivial model for the frequency-severity scale invariance would be a tight connection with size of the targeted city and the number of casualties. That is, because city populations are distributed as a power law, we may suppose that an event's severity is proportional to the size of the target city. If target cities are chosen roughly uniformly at random, an obviously unrealistic idealization, then a power law in the frequency-severity statistics follows naturally. Tabulating population estimates for cities in our database from publicly available census data, we find that the correlation between an event's severity and the target city population is very weak, r = 0.2(2) for deaths and r = 0.2(1) for total severity, where the number in parentheses is the standard error from a bootstrap resampling of the correlation calculation. A regression model on other characteristics of the target cities may yield better results.
In the context of guerilla conflicts, Johnson et al. (2005 Johnson et al. ( , 2006 have proposed a dynamic equilibrium model that produces exponents in the range of 1.5 to 3.5 depending on a parameter that is related to the rates of fragmentation and coalescence of the insurgent groups; they conjecture that the value 2.5 is universal for asymmetric conflict. As an alternative explanation to the origin of the scale invariance that we observe in terrorism, we propose and analyze a simple, non-spatially extended toy model of a competitive process between states and non-state actors. This process produces exponents that vary depending on the model parameters, as can be the case when the statistics are controlled for economic development or weapon type. Thus these parameters could be fitted to explain the varying exponents we see for different weapon types or the degree of economic development.
Consider a non-state actor (i.e., a terrorist) who is planning an attack. Intuitively, the more severe an event is to be, the more planning it will require. Reversing this relationship, we say that the size of the planned event grows with time, up to some finite limit imposed perhaps by the choice of weapon (as suggested by Fig. 4) , the choice of target, or the available resources. If we further assume that the rate at which additional planning pays off is proportional to the amount of time already invested, i.e., increasing the severity of a well-planned event is easier than for a more ad hoc event, then the severity of a planned event will be p(t) ∝ e κt , where κ > 0 is a constant. However, many planned events are prevented from becoming a reality for a variety of reasons. To model this selection process, we say that the probability that a planned event will be executed is exponentially related to its size, ie., the larger the event, the more chance such an effort will be abandoned, executed before planning is complete, the actor incarcerated by the state, or that the effort will simply fail. Thus, we may say that the severity of a real event is related by x ∝ e λt , where λ < 0 is a constant. To derive the distribution of events that actually occur, we must solve the identity
a transformation of variables between the potential severity distribution and the actual severity distribution. Doing so yields p(x) ∝ x −α where α = 1 − κ/λ. It may be plausible that both state and actors will, through a process much like co-evolution of parasites and hosts, develop roughly equal capabilities, but perhaps with a slight advantage toward the state by virtue of its longevity relative to terrorist organizations, such that |κ| |λ|. In this case, we have a power law with exponent α 2, in approximate agreement with our empirical data. Naturally, the geopolitical and cultural factors relevant to a specific terrorist attack are extremely complex, and our toy model intentionally omits them. Presumably, these factors would influence the values assumed by the parameters of our model, and are essential for explaining the variety of scaling exponents we observe in the data, e.g., the different scaling exponents for OECD and non-OECD nations and for attacks perpetrated using different weapons. The development of more realistic models, perhaps by incorporating tools from evolutionary game theory, is a topic that we propose for the future.
Discussion and conclusions
Many of the traditional analyses of trends in terrorism are comparative, descriptive, historical or institutional, and those that are statistical rely on assumptions of normality and thus treat rare-but-severe events as qualitatively different from less severe but common events (Reich, 1990; FBI, 1999; Dept. of State, 2004; Rosendorff and Sandler, 2005) . We show that these assumptions are fundamentally false, by demonstrating that Richardson's discovery of scale invariance in the frequency-severity statistics of wars extends to the same statistics for terrorism. Notably, however, the estimates of the scaling behavior for wars differs substantially from that which we observe for terrorism, i.e., the frequency-severity of wars scales very slowly, with α war = 1.80(9) while the distribution scales much more steeply for terrorism, α deaths = 2.36(7).
Taking Richardson's program of study on the statistics of deadly human conflicts in conjunction with the results given here, our previous study of terrorism (Clauset and Young, 2005) and the Johnson et al. study of insurgent conflicts (Johnson et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 2006) , we may now make the conjecture that not only is scale invariance a generic feature of the severity distribution of deadly human conflicts, but it is the differences in the type of conflict that determine the particular scaling behavior, i.e., the values of the scaling exponent α and the lower-limit of the scaling x min . Indeed, this variation is precisely what we observe when we control for attributes like the degree of economic development, and the type of weapon used in the attack. A significant open question for future work remains to determine how and why the distinguishing attributes of a conflict, such as the degree of asymmetry, the length of campaign and the political agenda, affect the observed scaling behavior.
The strength of our scale invariance results for terrorism prompts us to consider whether existing traditional studies of terrorism can account for this empirical feature. These studies have suggested many useful models of the strategic behavior underlying resort to terrorism, as well as the likely effectiveness of specific forms of government interventions, in particular with respect to possible substitution effects, where terrorist may resort to alternative targets and techniques as particular targets become relatively more difficult to attack (Enders and Sandler, 2006) . However, despite Richardson's (1948) evidence for scale invariance in the severity of war, researchers have ignored the same phenomenon in the severity of terrorist events. From a policy perspective, this and the other empirical regularities we describe will be helpful in both forecasting the severity distribution of future terrorist attacks, forecasting trends in the severity of global terrorism, and in contingency planning, since most efforts to thwart terrorist violence or address its origins are unlikely to completely eradicate all incidences of terrorism, at least in the short run. Further, an accounting of the severity of events, in addition to other aspects such as the target, strategy and weapon type, will benefit policy makers in deciding how to allocate resources for the prevention of terrorism.
At a more fundamental level, adequate models to understand and explain terrorism must be able to generate the observed frequency-severity distribution, as do both the toy model we present here and the model proposed by Johnson et al. (2005 Johnson et al. ( , 2006 , but also match other important statistical regularities in terrorism. These models offer several interesting avenues of future inquiry and validation, but we encourage the community to continue to consider alternative microscopic mechanisms that may give rise to the observed statistical patterns. We hope that the results we describe herein have sufficiently highlighted the importance of accounting for the robust empirical patterns we have observed in the distribution of the severity of terrorist events, and that is serves to motivate further investigations in the area. 
Appendix A: Statistical methodology
Since Richardson first considered the scale invariance in the frequency and severity of wars, statistical methods for characterizing power laws have advanced significantly. The signature feature of a tail distribution that decays as a power law is a straight-line with slope α on doubly logarithmic axes. As such, a popular method of measuring the scaling exponent α has been least-squares regression on log-transformed data, i.e., one takes the log of both the dependent and independent variables and measures the slope using a least-squares linear fit. Unfortunately, this estimator for the scaling exponent is known to yield biased estimates of the scaling exponent (Goldstein et al., 2004 ). An unbiased estimator can be derived using the method of maximum likelihood (Newman, 2005) , and is given as
, where x min denotes the lowest value for which the scaling holds, i.e., it denotes the beginning of the tail distribution and n is the number of observations in the tail. Typically, x min is estimated visually, and, when the data span many orders of magnitude, a conservative estimate of x min is sufficient. For the terrorist events, the severity data only spans a few orders of magnitude and a conservative estimate would result in an underpopulated tail. This would, in turn, give our tests little statistical power. To ameliorate this problem, we use a numerical method for selecting the x min that yields the best power-law model for the data. Specifically, for each x min over some reasonable range, we first calculate the maximum likelihood exponent α ML on the data X ≥ x min , and measure the KolmogorovSmirnov (KS) goodness-of-fit statistic when comparing the data being fit and a theoretical power-law distribution with parameters α ML and x min . We then select the x min that yields the best fit to our data under this test. For simulated data with similar characteristics to the MIPT data, we find that this method correctly estimates both the lower bound on the scaling and the scaling exponent. Mathematically, we say that x min = min y max x F n (x; α, y) −F n (x; y) , where F (x; y, α) is the theoretical cumulative distribution function (cdf) for the power law with parameters α and x min = y, andF n (x; y) is the empirical distribution function (edf) for the n observed data points greater than y.
Once the parameters for the power law have been estimated, we then measure the standard error in α via bootstrap. The errors reported in Tables 1 and 2 for α are derived in this manner. The statistical significance value is derived by a Monte Carlo simulation of data drawn from F n (x; α, x min ), where α and x min have been estimated as above, under the one-sided KS test. Tabulating the results of the simulation yields an appropriate table of p-values for the fit.
As mentioned in the text, there are many heavy-tailed distributions, e.g., the q-exponential e −αx q , the stretched exponential e −αx β , the log-normal, and even a different two-parameter power law (c + x) −α . For data that span only a few orders of magnitude, the behavior of these functions can be statistically indistinguishable. As such, we cannot rule out all Type II statistical errors for our power law models; however, we note that for the distributions described in Section 3, the statistical power test versus a log-normal model indicates that the power law better represents the empirical data.
